This report summarizes the results of three detailed studies of the physical protection systems for the protection of nuclear materials transport in Japan, with an emphasis on the transportation of mixed oxide fuel materials 1 . The Japanese infrastructure for transporting nuclear fuel materials is addressed in the first section. The second section of this report presents a summary of baseline data from the open literature on the threats of sabotage and theft during the transport of nuclear fuel materials in Japan. The third section summarizes a review of current International Atomic Energy Agency, Japanese and United States guidelines and regulations concerning the physical protection for the transportation of nuclear fuel materials.
Issued by Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the United States Department of Energy by Sandia Corporation.
Introduction and Scope
Japan is one of the world's major industrial democracies and Japan relies on other countries for 80% of its energy supply. To increase energy independence, while reducing the emission of greenhouse gases, the Government of Japan (GOJ) has embarked on an ambitious program to expand the use of nuclear power. Expanding the use of nuclear power requires the GOJ to address many technical, economic, political and social challenges. One of these challenges is to insure the physical protection of the transport of nuclear fuel materials. Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) have undertaken a cooperative study and training program focused on the GOJ's system for physical protection of the transportation of nuclear fuel materials, with an emphasis on mixed oxide (MOX) fuel materials. This collaborative effort is funded by JAEA and the work scope is defined in "Action Sheet" 61 signed by the United States Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration and JAEA.
The Action Sheet 61 work is divided into four tasks. This report summarizes the Task 1 findings. The results of Tasks 2, 3, and 4 will be addressed in subsequent reports. Under Task 1, SNL and JAEA collected and analyzed baseline data on Japan's nuclear fuel materials transportation system. This Task 1 baseline data is documented in the three detailed reports listed below:
1. "Overview of Transportation Infrastructure for Nuclear Fuel Materials" -This report reviews the infrastructure for the transportation of nuclear fuel materials in Japan with an emphasis on the transportation of mixed oxide fuel materials. This JAEA-internal report was prepared by Yuichiro Ouchi. This report, the fourth report developed under Task 1, summarizes the resulted of the three detailed reports listed above 2 .
Japan's Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Cycle Facilities

Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
In Japan, 52 conventional light water reactors (LWRs) operate at 16 commercial nuclear power plants ( 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities
There are two uranium enrichment plants, one reconversion plant, and four fuel fabrication plants for commercial LWRs. There are also two reprocessing plants, of which one is currently under construction in Rokkasho-mura, Aomori-prefecture and another is in operation in Tokaimura, Ibaraki-prefecture. The location of these facilities is shown in Figure 2 -2. Nuclear fuel materials used by commercial NPPs are mainly transported by sea in cargo ships from abroad in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ), uranium oxide powder (UO 2 , U 3 O 8 ), or fuel assemblies. Most of these materials are unloaded at the Port of Tokyo, and then transported by land from the port to each facility.
Several of these facilities are operated by the Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) in Rokkashomura. These facilities include the Low-level Radioactive Waste (LLW) Disposal Center (LLW Center) and the Vitrified High-Level Waste (HLW) Storage Center (HLW Center), as well as the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), which is currently under construction. The storage pool of the RRP has already accepted significant quantities of spent nuclear fuel assemblies from the commercial NPPs.
Mixed Oxide Fuels
The production of electricity in each of the 52 conventional LWRs decreases the Uranium-235 (U-235) content in the uranium fuel pellets and increases the content of fission "by-products" such as Strontium-90. At the same time, some of the non-fissionable U-238 in the uranium fuel pellets is converted to plutonium by neutron capture. After about three years of operation, the U-235 content has decreased, and the fission by-products have increased to the point where reactor criticality can not be maintained and the fuel rods are removed and managed as spent nuclear fuel. Spent fuel (SF) from uranium fuel pellets typically contains about 1% plutonium. The 1% plutonium in the SF is composed of about two-thirds Plutonium-239 (Pu-239) and about onethird other isotopes of plutonium such as Pu-240 and Pu-241. : Enrichment *1) JNFL: Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited *2) JNC: Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute *3) MNF: Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd *4) NFI: Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd *5) JAERI: Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute *6) GNF-J: Global Nuclear Fuel Japan Co., Ltd Some countries utilize the "once through" cycle in which the SF will be disposed in a geologic repository. Other countries recycle the fissionable plutonium from the SF and create new fuel pellets that can be used in conventional LWRs to produce more electricity. The new fuel is composed of oxides of plutonium and oxides of uranium (PuO 2 + UO 2 ) and the mixture of oxides is known as MOX fuel. MOX fuel pellets contain about 7% fissionable Pu-239 rather than 4% fissionable U-235 in the uranium fuel pellets. Utilizing MOX fuel in a conventional LWR (1) recycles an important source of energy from the SF, (2) reduces the amount of radioactive waste that must be disposed, (3) reduces the amount of U-235 that must be mined, milled, and enriched, and (4) reduces Japans dependence on imported energy. Figure 2-3 shows a photograph of a fuel pellet used in a conventional LWR and a fuel pellet used in a FBR. The fuel pellets are placed in fuel rods and the fuel rods are combined into fuel assemblies.
MOX is widely used in conventional LWRs in Europe. Typically, about one-third of the fuel assemblies in a conventional LWR will be composed of MOX fuel and two-thirds of the fuel assemblies will be composed of conventional U-235 fuel. The use of one-third MOX fuel and two-thirds U-235 fuel does not alter the engineering or operational characteristics of a conventional LWR. Japan plans to utilize MOX fuel in about one-third of its commercial LWRs by 2010. The use of MOX in conventional LWRs is also known as "Pu-thermal." MOX fuel can also be used in a FBR. The FBR is specifically designed to utilize fast (high-energy) neutrons to fission the MOX fuel. There are design differences between a FBR and a conventional LWR. The FBR contains MOX fuel assemblies and a "blanket" of uranium assemblies. Over longer time periods, the FBR creates more plutonium (through neutron capture) than is fissioned. In Japan, Monju is a prototype FBR for establishment of commercial FBR technology. The MOX fuel used in a FBR contains about 16 -21 % plutonium, rather than the 7% plutonium typically used in MOX in a conventional thermal spectrum LWR. Because a FBR produces more plutonium that is consumed, the recycling of plutonium from a FBR will greatly reduce Japan's dependence on foreign energy sources.
In the FBR cycle in Japan, MOX fuels are fabricated in JAEA's Tokai Works in Tokai-mura, Ibaraki-prefecture. The Tokai Works includes the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) (from undated JAEA Brochure) and the Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP) (Figure 2-4) . The TRP is accepting some SF assemblies from commercial NPPs and all of the SF assemblies from the Advanced Thermal Reactor "Fugen." The MOX fuels produced at the PFPF are used in the FBRs Monju and Joyo. Formerly, most SF assemblies from commercial NPPs were transported by ship to overseas reprocessing plants. Overseas reprocessing was completed in December 2000. The majority of the SF assemblies are currently transported and stored in the RRP, and the minority of the SF assemblies are transported and stored at the TRP. HLW generated by the overseas reprocessing plants is returned to the HLW Center of JNFL. A part of the plutonium recovered from the overseas reprocessing of Japanese SF was transported by sea from a foreign reprocessing plant to Japan at the end of 1992. This recovered plutonium was, and will be used, to create MOX fuel for the FBR Monju. 
Transport of Enriched UO2 Powder from a Foreign Plant
As fuel for FBR Joyo, UO 2 powder with an enrichment of approximately 20 wt% U-235 is transported from a foreign plant. The first shipment took place in 2002. Subsequent shipments are expected to take place on a regular basis. The transport operation will be for Category II quantities. In transporting from a foreign plant, a package called "FS-47" is used. The package was designed to use to transport PuO 2 powder from a foreign plant to Japan. The exclusive container is also used to transport the UO 2 . The containers are transported by rail and sea to the port in Japan. From the Port the containers are transported by land in trailers to the PFPF in Tokai.
Future Plan to Transport MOX Powder from Rokkasho to Tokai
In the future, JAEA plans to begin procuring MOX powder from RRP for making MOX fuel for Monju and Joyo. If Monju and Joyo operate as planned, they will need approximately 1.6 tons of heavy metal in MOX (50% UO 2 + 50% PuO 2 ) per year. A cask for the transport of the MOX powder from RRP to the PFPF is currently being designed to hold tens of kg of MOX powder (PATRAM, 2004) . 
Typical Land Transport Operations for MOX Materials
Transport Convoy
In transporting MOX fuel materials by land, a convoy of several truck/trailers and accompanying vehicles is organized to insure safe and secure transport operations. The escort car and guard car are accompanied in the front and behind the transport vehicles.
Transport Control Center
The Transport Control Center at the shipper's site is staffed by one responsible person, one person in charge of the transport monitoring system, and several communications personnel, to monitor the entire transport operation from departure to arrival of the convoy. Contact between the convoy and the Center takes place at predetermined fixed points along the route, as well as whenever something out of the ordinary happens. The Center relays both the routine and occasional information received from the convoy to the receiver's site.
Transportation Monitoring System
The Transport Control Center constantly tracks the location of the convoy during transport using a monitoring system such as a global positioning system (GPS) that allows monitoring the convoy. The system tracks the location of the convoy and allows the convoy to send textual information to the Center. Furthermore, a specialist accompanying the convoy is equipped with a visual device that allows transmission of images from the convoy to the Center.
Emergency Response
The Transport Control Center is responsible for managing normal transport operations; however, an Accident Task 
Threats Identified in the Open Literature
Introduction
The open literature was reviewed to gather information on possible threats of sabotage and theft during the transportation of nuclear fuel materials in Japan 6 . This literature review was intended to aid in the development of a design basis threat (DBT) for the AS 61 Task 2 work. A DBT is defined by the IAEA as the attributes and characteristics of potential insider and/or external adversaries who might attempt unauthorized removal or sabotage of nuclear material.
Information from the open literature was categorized according to the schema in The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems by Mary Lynn Garcia. According to Garcia, adversaries can be categorized into three broad groups: outsiders, insiders, and outsiders working in collusion with insiders. Outsiders might include terrorists, criminals, or extremists. Ideological, economic or personal reasons are motivations that might prompt adversaries. An insider is defined as anyone that possesses knowledge of operations or security systems and has unescorted access to facilities or security interests. Insiders can be passive, or active, nonviolent, or violent. Insiders can have the same motivations as outsiders.
Demographics
Japan has a relatively homogeneous population with 99% of the estimated 127,000,000 people being ethnic Japanese people. One percent of the population is of non-Japanese origin, including:
• The religious preferences show that 84 percent of the population practice both Shinto and Buddhism, 0.7 percent practice Christianity and the balance practice various other religions.
Outsider 4.3.1 Terrorist Threat
Red Army, Chukaku-Ha, and Seikijuku
Known terrorist groups in Japan comprise the Red Army, Chukaku-Ha, Seikijuku, and Aum Shinrikyo. The Red Army's goals were to overthrow the Japanese government and ignite global revolution through violent, guerrilla means. The Red Army split into three factions: the Yodo Group, the Japanese Red Army, and the United Red Army operating in North Korea, Lebanon, and Japan, respectively. Each faction eventually adopted a local doctrine. The Yodo Group adopted the philosophy of the North Korean leader in 1969, Kim Jong Il; the Japanese Red Army adopted the philosophy of the Palestinian struggle for liberation; and the United Red Army sought the overthrow of Japan's monarchy. They incited global fear and intimidation though their terrorist activities but were not successful on a large scale.
Chukaku-Ha, the Middle Core Faction or Nucleus, sought to demonstrate frustration with Japan's imperialism, the imperialism of the West, and the Gulf War through violent protests with rudimentary rockets and incendiary devices. Seikijuku, or Sane Thinkers School, a right-wing group, seeks to protect and reinstate the role of the Emperor in Japan.
Aum Shinsen
Aum Shinsen no Kai was formed in 1984. It was headed by Chizo Matsumoto, more commonly known as Shoko Asahara, "the one who has attained supreme truth." Asahara was the selfproclaimed guru and holy man. Young Japanese, including academically-able scientists, medical doctors, and engineers, willingly at first, pledged complete obedience and devotion to the guru. They gave up their lives and assets to feed the organization's need for membership and 300 million to one billion U.S. dollars' worth of assets. At the time of the infamous subway attack in 1995, Aum Shinrikyo's membership totaled an approximate 19,000 people.
Only after the defeat of twenty-five of the members running in the 1990 Japanese general election did Asahara begin to preach that Aum Shinrikyo was being attacked by biological and chemical weapons in an attempt to justify the acquisition of similar weapons.
None of these biological weapons programs were successful, though Aum executed nine biowarfare pseudo-attacks. The first involved venting botulinum toxin from a van as the van drove through Tokyo, Narita International Airport, and other locations. According to police reports, the second and third incidents in 1993 consisted of a failed aerosolization of a veterinary inoculation anthrax strain on top of an eight-story building.
The Aum technical expertise was much more adept with chemical synthesis than it was with bioweapon development. They successfully concocted numerous chemical agents including nerve agent VX, tabun, soman, mustard, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, and sarin. Aum's release of 12 liters of Sarin in1994 at the Matsumoto Castle in Matsumo City exposed 600 people, hospitalizing 58 residents and killed seven people.
While preparation for the subway attack were underway in 1995, Aum members firebombed several buildings in Tokyo, and the attackers they left fake fliers from a rival sect in order to try to keep Aum away from the blame and confuse police. Aum Shrinkyo attacked Tokyo's subway system the morning of March 20, 1995. Five attackers punctured a total of eight of eleven bags of sarin before exiting the subway cars. Throughout the course of the day, 5,510 casualties reported to medical centers of which 4,470 were psychogenic patients and 54 were critically or severely wounded. The gassing resulted in 12 fatalities, and widespread fear in Japan, as well as the rest of the world.
After Aum Shinrikyo's attack on the Tokyo subway, the government arrested over 200 elite members of Aum and put the cult under surveillance. According to the United States Embassy in Japan, in July 2001 several Russian Aum Shinrikyo followers were arrested under the suspicion of a plan to bomb the Imperial Palace in Tokyo in order to free Asahara and take him to Russia. Asahara was sentenced in February 2004, and subsequently received the death penalty for crimes associated with the 1995 subway attack.
At its peak, Aum Shinrikyo was a well established organization with millions of U.S. dollars in monetary resources, substantial amounts of weapons, and a membership of thousands of people in Japan with intellectual and technical capability.
Japan's Support of U.S. in Iraq and al-Qaeda
Examination of the external terrorist threat must take into consideration the international relations. Japan supported the U.S. in its war on terrorism and war in Iraq. Such alliances may make Japan a target for both international and domestic terrorists. The 2004 Madrid train bombings exemplify the actions of terrorists against countries that support U.S. policy.
Seven people with suspected links to al-Qaeda were arrested in Japan at the beginning of June, 2004 including a Frenchman, Lionel Dumont, who traveled, lived, and worked in Japan several times for over a year beginning in 2002 with a false passport and without arousing suspicion of Japanese authorities and employers, even though he had been placed on the world's most wanted list in 1999. Another member of al-Qaeda, an Algerian, Ahmed Ressam, was linked to plans to plant a bomb in the Los Angeles airport in 2000, and was convicted in the U.S. In light of these events, Japan has begun to reduce the number of illegal immigrants. In 2003, 50,000 foreigners were deported, and Japanese authorities aim to deport another half of its illegal immigrant population of 250,000.
North Korean Abductions
Japan holds several grievances against North Korea including the kidnappings of 11 Japanese in the early 1980s, which continue to hamper progress towards improving relations. The chairman of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kim Jong-Il admitted abduction of the 11 Japanese at the September 17, 2002 Japan-North Korea summit meeting. Throughout a series of Japan-North Korea Normalization and Six-Party Talks, Japan has continued to reiterate the importance of the unconditional release of the eight family members of those abducted, and an inquiry into the indefinite whereabouts of the other ten abducted Japanese. Japan has stated that the resolution of this issue is essential for all other issues to be determined.
North Korean Missiles and Nuclear Weapons
The Council on Foreign Relations contends that Japan is vulnerable to an attack from North Korea, due to its close proximity and good relations with the U.S. 
North Korean Boats
In 2001 and 2002, Japanese officials became increasingly alarmed by the encroachment of espionage and drug-running ships believed to be of North Korean origin into Japanese waters. The ships often releasing smaller boats that in turn launched rubber rafts to ferry agents to and from the Japanese coast. The agents were believed to have relied primarily upon the approximately 200,000 Korean residents of Japan who identify themselves as North Korean citizens. The agents are also believed to have used threats against family members in North Korea as a means of coercion. In December 2001, Japanese coast guard patrol boats chased and exchanged fire with one suspected North Korean spy ship disguised as a Chinese fishing boat. The confrontation ended when the mystery boat sank inside China's exclusive economic zone. North Korean cigarettes and a badge of the deceased leader Kim Il-Sung were found as some of the evidence of the ship's origin. Dozens of automatic weapons, a surface to air missile launcher and an underwater scooter capable of carrying three people were found in the sunken ship, along with ten bodies.
Criminal Threat
While the crime rate has risen in recent years, it is still well below the threshold of concern for western countries. The Japan National Police Agency reported a total of 2,790,000 penal code crime cases known to the public in 
Anti-Nuclear Threat
The 
Insider
The insider threat includes the threats of disgruntled, coerced, psychotic, and criminal employees. The disgruntled employee threat has been almost unthinkable in Japan, given the history of Japan's employment system. The Japanese have historically viewed their employment by a specific company as a relationship where loyalty and trust are essential and training, teamwork, and hard work are methodologies for success. Life-long employment and keiretsu are both expressions of the same thing-the view of Japanese society as the extension of the family. Despite the prevalence of mutuality of company-employee relationships, only 30 to 40 percent of companies honor lifetime employment.
One in ten Japanese corporations reported corporate crime from 2001 to 2003, and much more crime is believed to occur undetected. Asset misappropriation is reported to be the highest fraud practiced, while cybercrime and product piracy and counterfeiting comprise the concerns for the near future. Threats of the employee being forced into cooperating via blackmail and the psychotic employee must also be considered in determining the insider threat, along with the threat of the criminal employee.
Physical Protection of Transportation Guidelines and Regulations
Introduction
As a part of the Task 1 activities of Action Sheet 61, SNL and JAEA collected and analyzed IAEA guidelines and Japanese and U.S. regulations concerning the physical protection of the transportation of nuclear fuel materials, with an emphasis on transportation of mixed oxide fuel materials 8 . This collection and analysis task was conducted in 2005.
International Atomic Energy Agency Recommendations
With respect to the issue of transporting nuclear materials, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIRC/274
Rev.1) obligates parties to make specific arrangements and meet defined standards of physical protection for international shipments of nuclear material, as well as cooperate in the recovery of stolen nuclear material.
Generally, a physical protection system is designed to be effective against the Member State's DBT. The DBT is defined by the IAEA as the attributes and characteristics of potential insider and/or external adversaries who might attempt unauthorized removal or sabotage of nuclear material.
The IAEA recommends a graded approach in which the physical protection measures are matched to the "value" of the nuclear asset. In implementing the graded approach, the IAEA categorizes fissile materials into Categories I, II, and III quantities, with Category I quantities requiring the greatest protective measures.
IAEA recommendations for shipping Category I quantities by road include vehicles that are specially designed to resist attack and equipped with a vehicle disabling device so that an adversary cannot drive a captured vehicle away. Each load vehicle should carry a guard, and a corresponding escort vehicle should be manned with one or more guards. Radio communications must be maintained at all times. For shipments of Category I nuclear material quantities by rail, sea, or air, the IAEA recommends that "exclusive use" freight trains, transport ships, or cargo planes be employed.
Member States are encouraged to use armed guards to the extent that laws and regulations permit. If the guards are not armed, other compensatory measures must be applied. An adequately sized, equipped, and trained response force must be available to deal with emergencies. There must be enough detection, delay, and communication that the responses force can arrive in time to prevent the theft or sabotage.
Japanese Regulations
For safe transport of radioactive materials, Japan incorporated the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (IAEA transport regulations) and has implemented safety regulations in conformity with the IAEA Transport Regulations. For maritime and air transport, Japan is a contracting party to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention) and the Convention on International Civil Aviation (ICAO Convention). Legally binding international transport regulations in accordance with these conventions are incorporated into the Japanese relevant legislations. These conventions adopt the IAEA Transport Regulations through the UN Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods that are bases of regulations for international transport. Japanese law and regulations for sea transport and air transport are consistent with the IAEA Transport Regulations. Also, the Japanese regulations for land transport have been established in conformity with the IAEA Transport Regulations from the view-point of ensuring safe transport as well as consistency in modes of land, sea and air transport.
For physical protection of nuclear material, Japanese regulations for physical protection of nuclear material transports are established within the framework of international rules that include the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, bilateral agreements on nuclear energy cooperation with other countries, and the IAEA guidelines. The common international guideline for the physical protection of nuclear materials during use, storage and transportation is the IAEA's INFCIRC/225. Revision 4 of INFCIRC/225 has been issued by the IAEA, and currently competent authorities are discussing the incorporation of Reversion 4 recommendations into Japanese laws. This regulation review was completed in 2005.
Relevant organizations for regulations for nuclear facilities, etc. are:
• Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in charge of regulations for nuclear power stations, nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as commercial reactors, fabrication and reprocessing plants, etc., • Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) with jurisdiction over regulations for test and research nuclear reactors, using facilities for nuclear fuel materials and radioisotopes, etc. METI and MEXT are also responsible for the package requirements.
• Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT) has responsibilities for conveyance for land, sea, and air transport. This organization has jurisdiction over the conveyances requirements.
• Organizations for jurisdiction over regulations mainly for emergency response, accidents, security, etc. are the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and the National Police Agency (NPA).
The Japanese regulatory system uses a graded categorization system that is basically the same as the categorization system of the IAEA's INFCIRC/225. In addition, the Japanese system identifies specific nuclear materials to be protected (SNMPs). The Japanese laws for transport of nuclear materials are separately established for each transport mode:
• In addition to the safety requirements, the Reactor Safety Law sets physical protection requirements for protection of shipments containing SNMPs which correspond to Category I or II, or the irradiated SNMPs. These physical protection measures are not performance-based using a DBT, but are feature-based. Many of the current, required physical protection features are identical to the required safety features (e.g., Transport Control Center, emergency preparedness, and communications). There are additional security requirements such as:
• The use of a transport convoy that includes the person who is responsible for control and command for physical protection. Guards must also accompany the transport convoy.
• The use of hardened locks attached to packages containing nuclear material. Seals are also attached to the package to ascertain if the packages have been tampered.
• Notification of the Public Safety Commission. The licensee must notify the Public Safety Commission about the formation of the vehicles, the allocation of guard's car, arrangements of the guard personnel, and communication with the competent authorities. The transport certificate must be received by licensee from the Public Safety Commission before the transport can begin.
United States Regulations
Regulations governing transportation of nuclear fuel materials in the U.S. are also complicated.
Control of the production and use of fissile materials is delegated to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The U.S. NRC is responsible for regulating commercial nuclear fuel cycle activities, and the U.S. NRC may delegate their licensing authorities for by-product, source, and less-than-critical quantities of special nuclear materials (SNMs) to "Agreement States." There are relatively few commercial shipments of Category 1 quantities of special SNMs in the U.S. The U.S. DOE is responsible for regulating U.S. "atomic energy defense" transportation activities related to the U.S. nuclear weapons program. There are a significant number of U.S. DOE shipments of Category I quantities of SNMs.
The U.S NRC's 10 CFR 73.1(a) states that physical protection systems (PPSs) to protect formula quantities of strategic SNMs transport shall be designed to protect against a DBT (a formula quantity of strategic SNMs is the same as an IAEA Category I quantity). Since 1977, the U.S. NRC has required that PPSs be designed to protect against a DBT. The NRC's DBT for protection of formula quantities of strategic SNMs is defined in 73.1(a)(1) for radiological sabotage and in 73.1(a)(2) for theft of strategic quantities of SNMs. The DBT provides an objective measure to design and evaluate the effectiveness of PPSs.
The U.S. NRC's DBT for radiological sabotage includes the following general characteristics:
• A determined violent, external, assault of several persons: -with military training and skills, -with passive insider assistance (e.g., insider provides information), -with active insider assistance (e.g., disable alarms and participates in violent attack), -with suitable weapons, including hand-held automatic weapons having long-range accuracy, -with hand-carried incapacitating agents and explosives for entry or for destroying transporter, or container integrity, -with a four-wheel-drive land vehicle used to transport personnel and their hand-carried equipment, • An internal threat of an insider, including an employee (in any position), and • A four-wheel-drive land vehicle bomb.
The U.S. NRC's DBT for theft of formula quantities for strategic SNMs is the same as the DBT for radiological sabotage, but more rigorous in the following areas:
• The determined violent, external, assault is by "a small group of several persons," rather than "several persons."
• The small group of several people has the ability to operate as two or more teams.
• The small group has detailed knowledge of nuclear power plants and facilities, and • The small group has items and false documentation to facilitate theft of SNM.
Additionally, there are two classified U.S. NRC documents that list potential weaponry, tactics, and capabilities of the terrorist group described in general terms above.
The U.S. NRC's DBT was first upgraded in 1993 after the first attack on the World Trade Center, and a vehicle intrusion into the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. The DBT was upgraded again in April 2003 in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. On September 11 th , a total of 19 attackers, operating in four coordinated but separate teams, attacked the U.S. The attacks required significant technical training and over a year of preparation. The attacks of September 11 th led to a significant rethinking of the threats that nuclear security systems must be designed to address. The U.S. Government Accountability Office, citing others, states that the U.S. nuclear power industry has invested about $1 billion in security upgrades since September 11 th , 2001.
In addition to requiring that a transportation PPS be designed against the DBT, the NRC also required a PPS to meet general performance objectives of 10 CFR 73.20 for formula quantities of strategic SNMs and the performance capability requirements of 10 CFR 73.25. Examples of general performance objective for a PPS include:
• A design with sufficient redundancy and diversity to ensure maintenance of the capabilities.
• A testing and maintenance program.
Examples of performance capability requirements for "in-transit" PPSs of strategic SNM include:
• Preplanning itineraries,
• Tracking the movement of materials, • Detection and delay systems,
• Establishment of liaisons with local law enforcement authorities for assistance en route, and • Assurance that a single adversary action cannot destroy the capability to notify law enforcement forces of the need for assistance.
In addition to the DBT, the general performance objectives requirements and the performance capability requirements, the U.S. NRC's 10 CFR 73.26 requires transportation PPS for formula quantities of strategic SNMs to include systems, components and procedures. Examples of these include:
• Security arrangements must be pre-approved by the U.S. NRC, • The transportation shall include armed escorts, armed response personnel, a movement control center, and communications with local law enforcement authorities, • Armed escort personnel must be qualified for duty in accordance with Appendix B of 10 CFR 73. Armed escorts shall requalify at least every 12 months, • Armed escorts and armed response force personnel armament shall include handguns, shotguns, and semiautomatic rifles, as described in Appendix B of 10 CFR 73, • All transfers of strategic SNM shall be protected by at least seven armed escorts. Each of the seven armed escorts shall be capable of maintaining communication with each other, • Shipments made by sea shall be on container-ships. The strategic SNM container(s) shall be loaded into exclusive use cargo containers conforming to American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard MH5.1-"Basic Requirements for Cargo Containers" (1971) or International Standards Organization (ISO) 1496, "General Cargo Containers" (1978).
The U.S. NRC has other requirements for the transport of irradiated reactor and the transport of SNM of moderate or low strategic significance. Specific diagrams, armaments, and other information on PPS features must be protected as required in the U.S. NRC's 10 CFR 73.21 "Requirements for the protection of safeguards information."
The U.S. DOE is responsible for regulating U.S. atomic energy defense transportation activities and the U.S. DOE frequently transports Category 1 quantities of SNM. The U.S DOE implements its authority through a set of Directives, DOE Orders and regulations. In general terms, the DOE's uses a graded approach, which means that the highest level of protection is given to activities and materials whose theft and/or compromise would seriously affect national security. DOE PPSs must be based on the results of vulnerability and risk analyses designed to provide graded protection in accordance with an asset's importance. To determine the appropriate level of protection against risk, DOE must consider the nature of the threat, the vulnerability of the potential target, and the potential consequences of an adversarial act. The protection strategies identified in draft DOE O 470.1A include:
• denial of access, 
